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Consider a labor market in which firms want to insure existing employees against income fluctuations
and, simultaneously, want to recruit new employees to fill vacant jobs. Firms can commit to a wage
policy, i.e. a policy that specifies the wage paid to their employees as a function of tenure, productivity
and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to employ workers. In this environment, the
optimal wage policy prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior workers, but also a downward rigid
















Shimer (2005) documents that, according to the standard search model of the labor market
(Pissarides, 1985), productivity shocks account for an implausibly small fraction of the em-
pirical volatility of unemployment and vacancies. This ﬁnding has generated a signiﬁcant
research eﬀort devoted to reconciling the predictions of the model with the empirical behavior
of the labor market. Hall (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) are among the most promi-
nent examples of this eﬀort. These papers show that, when wage rigidities are introduced
into the model, productivity shocks lead to much larger and more plausible ﬂuctuations in
unemployment and vacancies. Interestingly, in these papers the source of ampliﬁcation of
productivity shocks is not the rigidity of the wage of workers who are already employed, but
the rigidity of the wage of newly hired workers (more precisely, the rigidity of the present
value of wages of newly hired workers). Indeed, the fact that the wage oﬀered to a worker in
an ongoing employment relationship does not respond to changes in productivity only aﬀects
the distribution of rents between the worker and his employer. In contrast, the fact that
the wage oﬀered to new hires does not respond to changes in productivity aﬀects the ﬁrms’
incentives to create vacancies and, in turn, aﬀects unemployment. However, why should the
wage of new hires be rigid? This paper answers the question.
We consider a directed search model of the labor market in the spirit of Moen (1997) and
Shimer (1996). Firms enter the market and announce their wage policy, i.e. a policy that
speciﬁes the wage paid to a worker as a function of his tenure, the idiosyncratic productivity
of the ﬁrm, and the aggregate state of the economy. Unemployed workers observe the wage
policy of new and old ﬁrms and choose where to apply for jobs. The application process is
subject to matching frictions. Because workers cannot access the capital market, ﬁrms have
an incentive to insure their employees against income ﬂuctuations. To accomplish this task
eﬃciently,1 ﬁrms would like to oﬀer to each of their workers a constant wage. Because of
search frictions and turnover, ﬁrms also have an incentive to attract new applicants to ﬁll
vacant jobs. To accomplish this task eﬃciently, ﬁrms would like to oﬀer to new hires a wage
that varies in response to changes in aggregate productivity. Hence, in some states of the
world, ﬁrms would like to oﬀer a hiring wage lower than the wage paid to existing employees.
1That is, to accomplish this task in a way that maximizes proﬁts.
2But what happens if, in one of these states, a ﬁrm ﬁnds an applicant that is qualiﬁed for
the job held by one the senior workers? If the ﬁrm cannot commit to the employment
relationship, it will simply replace the senior worker with the new applicant. This “worker
replacement” problem creates a tension between eﬃcient provision of insurance to senior
workers and eﬃcient recruitment of new hires.
The ﬁrst part of the paper characterizes the optimal wage policy of the ﬁrm in the
presence of the worker replacement problem. We ﬁnd that, when the ﬁrm is hit by a positive
productivity shock, the optimal policy prescribes that senior workers should be paid the
same wage as in the past (the eﬃcient insurance wage), and that new hires should be paid
t h ew a g et h a tm a x i m i z e st h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm’s vacant jobs (the eﬃcient hiring wage). These
wages do not induce the ﬁrm to replace senior workers with new recruits, because the eﬃcient
hiring wage is greater than the eﬃcient insurance wage. When the ﬁrm is hit by a negative
productivity shock, the optimal policy prescribes that senior workers and new recruits should
be paid exactly the same wage. The common wage is smaller than the wage paid to senior
workers in the past, and greater than the wage that maximizes the value of the ﬁrm’s vacant
jobs. The common wage guarantees that the ﬁrm will not replace senior workers with new
recruits, but it distorts the eﬃcient hiring wage up and the eﬃcient insurance wage down.
Overall, the worker replacement problem induces a form of downward rigidity in the wage
oﬀered to new hires by old ﬁrms.
The second part of the paper studies how the worker replacement problem aﬀects the
response of the labor market to productivity shocks. Here, the main ﬁnding is that the worker
replacement problem ampliﬁes the decline in vacancies and the increase in unemployment
in response to a negative shock, but has no eﬀect on the response of the labor market to
a positive shock. When the economy is hit by a negative shock, the worker replacement
problem dampens the decline in the wage oﬀered by old ﬁrms to new hires. This downward
wage rigidity distorts the ﬂow of applicants towards old ﬁrms, ampliﬁes the decline in the
number of new ﬁr m st h a te n t e rt h el a b o rm a r k e t ,a m p l i ﬁes the decline in vacancies and,
ultimately, ampliﬁes the increase in unemployment. In contrast, when the economy is hit
by a positive shock, the worker replacement problem does not aﬀect the hiring wage of old
ﬁrms and, for this reason, it has no eﬀect on vacancies and unemployment. Even though our
model is too abstract to carry out a thorough quantitative analysis, a back-of-the-envelope
3calculation shows that the worker replacement problem can easily account for 20 percent of
the increase in unemployment that takes place during a typical recession.
Our theory of downward rigidity in the hiring wage hinges on two elements. First, ﬁrms
want to oﬀer to each of their employees a constant wage to insure them against income
ﬂuctuations. Second, ﬁrms do not want to hire new employees for less than the wage of
senior employees to avoid the replacement problem. The ﬁrst element of our theory is the
cornerstone of the implicit contract literature (Azariadis, 1975) and is supported by vast
empirical evidence. For example, in a survey of US ﬁrms, Blinder and Choi (1990) ﬁnd that
the majority of managers agree that wages contain a countercyclical insurance payment.
There is also empirical evidence supporting the second, novel element of our theory. For
example, in a recent survey of Swedish ﬁrms, Agell and Bennmarker (2007) ﬁnd that 90
percent of managers are not willing to hire new workers for less than the wage of existing
workers. This ﬁnding is particularly striking considering that the survey was conducted in
the midst of a severe recession. Similarly, in a survey of US ﬁrms, Bewley (1999) ﬁnds that 79
percent of managers refuse to hire undercutters. Moreover, in both surveys, the majority of
managers argue (in accordance to our theory) that hiring undercutters would either violate
the personnel policy of the ﬁrm or some bargaining agreement with the unions.
The theory advanced in this paper is an alternative to recent theories of wage rigidity
based on asymmetric information.2 In Menzio (2005), ﬁrms do not want to increase the
hiring wage in expansions because they do not want to reveal to existing workers that the
gains from trade have increased and, hence, their wages can be renegotiated. In Kennan
(2009), workers do not demand higher wages in expansions because they do not want to
be turned down by those ﬁrms whose productivity did not increase. In Moen and Rosen
(2008), ﬁrms are reluctant to cut pay in response to negative shocks because of eﬃciency
wage considerations.
2Independently from us, Snell and Thomas (2008) develop a related theory of wage rigidity. They consider
a frictionless labor market populated by risk neutral ﬁrms and risk adverse workers who have no access to the
credit market. Under the assumption that a ﬁrm cannot pay a diﬀerent wage to workers with diﬀerent tenure,
they ﬁnd that the wage policy of the ﬁrm prescribes a wage that responds less to aggregate productivity shocks
than a spot market wage. Moreover, under the assumption that new ﬁrms cannot enter the labor market,
they ﬁnd that there is involuntary unemployment and that involuntary unemployment is countercyclical.
Our paper diﬀers from theirs for two main reasons. First, in our paper, the link between the wage of existing
workers and the wage of new hires emerges endogenously as part of the optimal solution to the replacement
problem. Second, in our paper, the rigidity in the wage of new hires ampliﬁes the response of unemployment
because it aﬀects the search strategy of unemployed workers and it crowds out the entry of new ﬁrms.
42M o d e l
This section develops a model of directed search à la Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996). In the
model, ﬁrms have an incentive to insure their employees against income ﬂuctuations because
workers are risk averse and cannot access the capital market. Firms also have a desire
to attract applicants to ﬁll the jobs that become vacant because of turnover. However, the
goals of insuring workers and attracting applicants may be in conﬂict because the ﬁrm cannot
commit not to replace senior employees with cheaper new hires.
2.1 Preferences and technologies




tυ(ct),w h e r eβ is the discount factor, and υ is a strictly increasing and strictly
concave utility function. A worker consumes his income each period, so consumption c
equals the wage w if the agent is working and b>0 if the agent is unemployed.
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs with positive measure. An entrepreneur has pref-




t,w h e r ece is the sum of proﬁts from ﬁrms the entrepreneur
owns.3 An entrepreneur can start a ﬁrm at the cost k>0.A ﬁrm operates a technology
that turns labor into output according to the production function min{n,n}y,w h e r en is the
measure of jobs at the ﬁrm, n is the measure of workers employed by the ﬁrm, and y is the
ﬁrm’s productivity. The productivity of a ﬁrm in its ﬁrst period of activity is y1,w h e r ey1
is a discrete random variable drawn from the probability distribution π1(y1|x). The produc-
tivity of a ﬁrm in its second period of activity is y2,w h e r ey2 is a discrete random variable
drawn from the distribution π2(y2|x). To simplify the analysis, we assume that ﬁrms exit the
market after two periods. The distribution of ﬁrm’s productivities depends on the aggregate
state of the economy x, which follows a Markov chain with transition probabilities πx(x0|x).
A period is divided into four stages: separation, entry, search and production. At the
separation stage, an employed worker becomes unemployed for exogenous reasons with prob-
3As discussed in Rudanko (2009), the assumption that entrepreneurs and workers have a diﬀerent pref-
erence for risk can be motivated in a number of ways. First, if becoming an entrepreneur or a worker is a
choice, it is natural to expect less risk averse agents to become entrepreneurs and more risk averse agents to
become workers. Second, if entrepreneurs are wealthier than workers, they might behave as if they were less
risk averse. Finally, it might be the case that entrepreneurs have better access to asset markets and, hence,
can insure away risk.
5ability δ. Moreover, at this stage, an employed worker has the option to leave his job and
become unemployed, and a ﬁrm has the option to dismiss any of its workers.
At the entry stage, an entrepreneur chooses how many new ﬁrms to create. After realizing
the productivity y1,an e wﬁrm announces the wage policy σ =( w1,w 2i).T h eﬁrst element
of σ i st h ew a g ep a i dt oaw o r k e rw h oi se m p l o y e di nt h eﬁrst period of the ﬁrm’s life. The
second element is a function w2i(x0,y0
2,μ 0
2) which returns the wage paid to a worker who is
employed in the second period of the ﬁrm’s life, conditional on the worker’s tenure i,t h e
aggregate state of the economy x0,t h eﬁrm’s productivity y0
2, and a sunspot μ0
2.T h es u n s p o t
is a random variable drawn from the uniform distribution with unit support.4
If a worker was unemployed at the beginning of the period, he has the opportunity to
apply for a job at the search stage. For simplicity, we assume that a worker cannot apply
f o raj o bi fh ei se m p l o y e do ri fh eb e c a m eu n e m p l o y e dd u r i n gt h es e p a r a t i o ns t a g e . T h e
application process is directed, in the sense that a worker applies for a particular job at
a particular ﬁrm.5 If the worker applies for a job of type W, his application is successful
with probability p(θ(W)),w h e r eθ(W) is the ratio of applicants to jobs of type W and p is
a strictly decreasing function such that p(0) = 1 and p(∞)=0 . Following Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999), we refer to θ(W) as the queue length for the job. Symmetrically, the ﬁrm
ﬁnds a successful applicant for a job of type W with probability q(θ(W)),w h e r eq is a strictly
increasing function such that q(θ)=p(θ)θ, q(0) = 0,q (∞)=1 . Moreover, the elasticity of
q wrt θ,  q(θ),i ss u c ht h a tq(θ) q(θ)/[1 −  q(θ)] is a decreasing function of θ.6 When a ﬁrm
ﬁnds a successful applicant for a job, it has the option to hire him and dismiss any other
w o r k e rw h om i g h th a v eb e e nh o l d i n gt h ej o b .T h et y p eo faj o bi st h ev a l u et h a ti to ﬀers to
a successful applicant.
At the production stage, production and consumption take place. Then nature draws
t h ea g g r e g a t es t a t eo ft h ee c o n o m yx0, the idiosyncratic productivity of the ﬁrm y0
2,a n dt h e
4Because of the sunspot, a change in the second period wages w2i(x0,y0
2,μ 0
2) has a marginal eﬀect on the
lifetime utility W1 provided to a worker hired in the ﬁrst period of the ﬁrm’s life. This property allows to
establish the necessary conditions (K) and (R), which are used to characterize the optimal wage policy. As
an alternative to the sunspot, one could assume that the productivity of the ﬁrm is a continuous random
variable.
5The qualitative results of our paper are robust to an alternative speciﬁcation of the search process in
which workers apply to ﬁrms rather than to speciﬁcj o b s .
6The assumptions on p(θ) and q(θ) are satisﬁed by many standard matching processes. For example,
they are satisﬁed by the urn-ball matching process, p(θ)=θ(1−exp(−1/θ)) and q(θ)=1−exp(−1/θ),a n d
by the telephone-line matching process, p(θ)=θ/(1 + θ) and q(θ)=1 /(1 + θ).
6sunspot μ0
2 f o rn e x tp e r i o d .T h ed r a w so ft h ep r o d u c t i v i t ya n dt h es u n s p o ta r ei n d e p e n d e n t
across ﬁrms.
The model incorporates some new elements in a model of directed search. First, the model
a s s u m e st h a te n t r e p r e n e u r sa r er i s kn e u t r a la n dt h a tw o r k e r sa r er i s ka v e r s ea n dc a n n o ta c c e s s
the capital market. The assumption is common in the literature on implicit contracts and
it implies that ﬁrms have an incentive to insure their workers against income ﬂuctuations
(Azariadis, 1985). Second, the model assumes that ﬁrms have limited commitment, in the
sense that ﬁrms can commit to a wage policy but cannot commit to employ any of their
workers. The assumption is also present in some of the literature on implicit contracts (see
e.g. MacLeod and Malcomson 1989 or Thomas and Worrall 1988). It is usually motivated by
the fact that a third party (say a court of law or a labor union) can easily verify how much
a worker is paid, but not whether a worker who has left the ﬁr mh a sd o n es ov o l u n t a r i l y ,
because of poor performance, because his job ceased to exist, or, in our case, because the
ﬁrm replaced him with a new hire. Lack of veriﬁability also motivates the assumption that
the wage paid by the ﬁrm to a worker cannot depend on whether the ﬁrm has found a
replacement for him, or on whether the worker has been hired as a replacement of somebody
else.7
Rudanko (2009) also introduces elements from the implicit contract literature in a model
of directed search. The main diﬀerence between her model and ours is the size of a ﬁrm.8
In her model, a ﬁrm has only one job. If the job is vacant, the only goal of the ﬁrm is to
recruit. If the job is ﬁlled, its only goal is to insure the worker. In our model, a ﬁrm has
many jobs. Therefore, the ﬁrm needs to insure existing workers and recruit new workers at
the same time. Because of limited commitment, there may be a tension between these two
goals. The resolution of this tension is the key to our theory of rigidity for the wage of new
hires.
7Note that we do not allow for wage renegotiation when the ﬁrm ﬁnds a replacement for the worker. It
is easy to justify this modeling choice. Assume that the ﬁrm privately observes whether a replacement for
the worker is available. Under this assumption, the ﬁrm has the incentive to announce that it has found a
replacement whether this is actually true or not. Hence, the worker ignores the announcement of the ﬁrm
and renegotiation does not take place. An analogous argument is used in many models of search on the job
to justify the assumption that wage renegotiation does not take place when an employed worker ﬁnds an
alternative employer (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen 1998).
8Another diﬀerence between Rudanko’s model and our model is the life span of a ﬁrm. In her model, a
ﬁrm has a constant probability of exiting the labor market in each period. In our model a ﬁrm exits the
labor market deterministically after two periods.
72.2 Competitive search equilibrium
Let Z(x) be the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker at the search stage, given that the
worker has the opportunity to apply for a job and the state of the economy is x. We refer to
Z as the value of search. Let U(x) ≤ Z(x) be the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker
at the production stage, given that the state of the economy is x. We refer to U as the value
of unemployment. Given U and Z, the queue length for a job of type W is
θ(W, x)=
½
θ : p(θ)W +( 1− p(θ))U(x)=Z(x), if W>Z (x),
0, if W ≤ Z(x). (1)
If the value of the job to a successful applicant, W, is greater than the value of search, Z,
the queue length is driven up to the point where workers are indiﬀerent between applying
for the job and searching somewhere else. If W is smaller than Z, the queue length is zero.
Notice that, if a worker applies for a ﬁlled job at a ﬁrm with a wage policy that speciﬁes
w21 ≥ w22, the worker will not be hired even if his application is successful. Hence, the value
of this job to a successful applicant is equal to the value of unemployment U, and the queue
length is zero. In contrast, if a worker applies for a ﬁlled job at a ﬁrm with a wage policy
that speciﬁes w21 <w 22, the worker will be hired if his application is successful. Hence, the
q u e u el e n g t ho ft h i sj o bm a yb ep o s i t i v e .
Given the value of search, Z, and the queue length for diﬀerent types of jobs, θ,o n ec a n
compute the value of unemployment and employment to the worker, as well as the value of
a ﬁrm to the entrepreneur. The value of unemployment to the worker is
U(x)=υ(b)+βEZ(x
0). (2)
In the current period, the worker consumes b units of output. At the search stage of next
period, the worker has the option of sending an application and his continuation utility is Z.
The value to the worker from being employed by an old ﬁrm at the wage w is
W2(w,x)=υ(w)+βEZ(x
0). (3)
In the current period, the worker consumes w units of output. At the end of the current
period, the ﬁrm exits the labor market and the worker moves into unemployment. At the
search stage of next period, the worker has the option of sending a job application and his
8continuation utility is Z.
The value to the worker from being employed by a new ﬁrm with wage policy σ is
W1(σ,x)=υ(w1)+βE{U(x





d = {δ if w22 ∈ [b,y0
2], 1 else},ρ= {0 if w22 ≤ w21, 1 else},
˜ q(w21,x 0)=q(θ(W2(w21,x 0)),x 0),
and the dependence of w21, w22, d and ρ on (x0,y 0
2,μ 0
2) is omitted for brevity. In the current
period, the worker consumes w1 units of output. At the separation stage of next period,
the worker moves into unemployment and gets the continuation utility U with probability
d,w h e r ed equals δ if b ≤ w22 ≤ y0
2 and d equals 1 otherwise. Intuitively, the worker
moves into unemployment for exogenous reasons with probability δ, he voluntarily moves
into unemployment if w22 <b ,a n dt h eﬁrm dismisses him if w22 >y 2. At the search stage,
the worker is replaced by a new hire and gets the continuation utility U with probability
(1 − d)ρ˜ q(w21,x 0),w h e r eρ equals 1 if w22 >w 21 and 0 otherwise. Intuitively, if w22 >
w21,t h eﬁrm has an incentive to replace the worker and will succeed in doing so with
probability ˜ q(w21,x 0). At the production stage of next period, the worker is still employed
with probability (1 − d)(1 − ρ˜ q(w21,x 0)). In this case, the worker’s continuation utility is
W2(w22).
The value to the entrepreneur of a new ﬁrm with wage policy σ is
F(σ,x,y1)= n1(y1 − w1)+βE{n1(1 − d)(1 − ρ˜ q(w21,x 0))(y0
2 − w22)}
+βE{[n − n1(1 − d)(1 − ρ)] ˜ q(w21,x 0)(y0
2 − w21)} (5)
where
n1 = nq(θ(W1(σ,x),x)).
At the search stage, the ﬁrm attracts θ(W1(σ)) applicants for each one of its n vacant jobs.
Hence, at the production stage, the ﬁrm employs n1 = nq(θ(W1(σ))) workers. At the search
stage of next period, the ﬁrm has n−n1(1−d) vacant jobs and n1(1−d) ﬁlled jobs. The ﬁrm
receives θ(W2(w21)) applications for each of its vacant jobs. In addition, the ﬁrm receives
θ(W2(w21)) applications for each of its ﬁlled jobs if w21 <w 22. Hence, at the production
stage, the ﬁrm employs n1(1 − d) senior workers and (n − n1(1 − d))˜ q(w21) new hires if
w21 ≥ w22,a n dn1(1 − d)(1 − ˜ q(w21)) senior workers and n˜ q(w21) new hires if w21 <w 22.
9We deﬁne an equilibrium along the lines of Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999),
and Rudanko (2009).
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive search equilibrium consists of a search value Z(x), a queue
length θ(W,x) and a wage policy σ(x,y1) with the following properties:
(i) Optimal application: For all (W,x), θ(W, x) satisﬁes (1).
(ii) Proﬁt maximization: For all (x,y1, ˜ σ), F(σ(x,y1),x,y 1) ≥ F(˜ σ,x,y1).
(iii) Zero proﬁt: For all x, Ey1 [F (σ(x,y1),x,y 1)] − k =0 .
Condition (i) ensures that the queue length is consistent with the optimal application
strategy of the workers. Condition (ii) ensures that a new ﬁrm chooses its wage policy to
maximize proﬁts. Condition (iii) ensures that free entry drives the maximized proﬁts of a
new ﬁrm down to zero. Formally, condition (i) pins down the queue length as a function of
Z, condition (ii) pins down the wage policy as a function of Z, and condition (iii) pins down
the equilibrium value of Z.
Note that the competitive search equilibrium is block recursive. That is, the system of
equations that pins down the equilibrium value of search, the queue length, and the wage
policy of new ﬁrms is independent of the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment
states and the distribution of old ﬁr m sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent wage policies. As explained in Menzio
and Shi (2009a, b), the block recursive nature of the equilibrium is a property common to
many models of directed search.
3 Microeconomics of worker replacement
This section characterizes the wage policy of the ﬁrm in the presence of the worker replace-
ment problem. From a technical point of view, this task is not trivial because the objective
function of the ﬁrm (5) is discontinuous with respect to the wage oﬀered to new hires in the
second period. In fact, if the hiring wage is greater than the wage of senior workers, the
ﬁrm does not attract any applications for its ﬁlled jobs. However, if the hiring wage is even
a penny less than the wage of senior workers, the ﬁrm attracts a non-negligible number of
applications to each of its ﬁlled jobs. Because of this discontinuity, one cannot use standard
optimality conditions to characterize the optimal wage policy.
103.1 Necessary condition for optimality
Let σ =( w1,w 2i) be the optimal wage policy of the ﬁrm, and let n1 be the number of
workers employed by the ﬁrm in its ﬁrst period of activity. Then, (w21,w 22) must maximize
the weighted sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the n1 senior workers’ utility in the ﬁrm’s second
period of activity, where the weight on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts is 1 and the weight on the senior
workers’ utility is 1/υ0(w1). The intuition behind this necessary condition for optimality is
simple and can be given here. A formal derivation of this condition is given in the proof of
lemma 2 in the appendix. Intuitively, the choice of (w21,w 22) has not only a direct eﬀect on
the proﬁts of the ﬁrm in the second period, but also an indirect eﬀect on the proﬁts of the
ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period, and the magnitude of this indirect eﬀect is precisely the utility of
senior workers weighted by 1/υ0(w1). In fact, a choice of (w21,w 22) that increases the utility
of senior workers in the second period by one unit allows the ﬁrm to lower the wage w1 by
1/υ0(w1) dollars without aﬀecting the lifetime utility W1 delivered to workers hired in the
ﬁrst period and, hence, without aﬀecting the number of workers n1 employed by the ﬁrm in
the ﬁrst period. For this reason, the optimal wage policy maximizes the weighted sum of
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’ utility in the second period.
Now, restrict attention to the set of wages that do not induce the ﬁrm to replace senior
workers with new hires, i.e. w22 ≤ w21, and do not induce the ﬁrm and the senior workers
to voluntarily break up at the separation stage, i.e. b ≤ w22 ≤ y2. Over this set of wages,
the maximized sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’ utility is9
Vk =m a x
(w21,w22)
n1 [δυ(b)+( 1− δ)υ(w22)]/υ0(w1)
+n1(1 − δ)(y2 − w22)+[ n − n1(1 − δ)] ˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21),
s.t. b ≤ w22 ≤ y2, w22 ≤ w21.
(K)
The ﬁrst term on the rhs of (K) is the utility of senior workers weighted by 1/υ0(w1).T h e
utility of each of the n1 senior workers is υ(b) with probability δ and υ(w22) with probability
1 − δ. The second term and third terms on the rhs of (K) are the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm employs n1(1 − δ) senior workers and earns a proﬁto fy2 − w22 on each of them. Also,
the ﬁrm employs [n − n1(1 − δ)] ˜ q(w21) new hires and earns a proﬁto fy2 − w21 on each of
them. Denote as (wk
21,w k
22) the solution to (K).
9For the sake of brevity, the dependence of Vk, Vr and ˆ V on w1, n1 and x is omitted.
11Next, restrict attention to the set of wages that induce the ﬁrm to replace senior workers
with new hires, i.e. w22 >w 21, but do not induce the ﬁrm and the senior workers to
voluntarily break up at the separation stage, i.e. b ≤ w22 ≤ y2. Over this set of wages, the
maximized sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’ utility is
Vr =m a x
(w21,w22)
n1 {υ(b)+( 1− δ)(1 − ˜ q(w21))[υ(w22) − υ(b)]}/υ0(w1)
+n1(1 − δ)(1 − ˜ q(w21))(y2 − w22)+n˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21),
s.t. b ≤ w22 ≤ y2, w22 >w 21.
(R)
The ﬁrst term on the rhs of (R) is the utility of senior workers weighted by 1/υ0(w1).T h e
utility of each of the n1 senior workers is υ(b) with probability δ +(1−δ)˜ q(w21),a n dυ(w22)
with complementary probability. The second and third terms on the rhs of (R) are the
proﬁts of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm employs n1(1−δ)(1− ˜ q(w21)) senior workers and earns a proﬁt
of y2 − w22 on each of them. Also, the ﬁrm employs n˜ q(w21) new hires and earns a proﬁto f
y2 − w21 on each of them. Denote as (wr
21,w r
22) the solution to (R).
Since the optimal wage schedule maximizes the sum of the proﬁts of the ﬁrm and the
utility of the senior workers over all (w21,w 22), the following result obtains.
Lemma 2 Let σ∗ =( w∗
1,w ∗
2i) be the optimal wage policy for a new ﬁrm. Then, σ∗ satisﬁes
the following necessary conditions for optimality: (i) If b ≤ w∗







22) and Vk ≥ Vr;( i i )I fb ≤ w∗
22 ≤ y2 and w∗
22 >w ∗





22) and Vr ≥ Vk; (iii) If and only if y2 ≥ b, b ≤ w∗
22 ≤ y2.
The proof of this and other lemmas can be found in the appendix.
3.2 Wage policy with and without replacement
Lemma 2 suggests a simple procedure for characterizing the optimal wage policy of the
ﬁrm. First, characterize the solution to (K). That is, characterize the wages that maximize
the sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’ utility subject to the no-replacement
constraint, w22 ≤ w21, and the individual rationality constraint, b ≤ w22 ≤ y2. Second,
characterize the solution to (R). That is, characterize the wages that maximize the sum
of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’ utility subject to the replacement constraint,
w22 >w 21, and the individual rationality constraint. Finally, compare the two maximized
sums to identify the prescriptions of the optimal wage policy. The following pages carry out
12this procedure under the maintained assumption that w1 and y2 are greater than z,w h e r ez
is the consumption equivalent of the ﬂow value of search, i.e. υ(z)=Z(x) − βEZ(x0).
3.2.1 Wage policy under commitment
As a preliminary step, it is useful to characterize the prescriptions of the optimal wage policy
if the ﬁrm could commit not to replace senior workers with new hires. In this case, one can
show that the optimal wage policy solves the problem
ˆ V =m a x
(w21,w22)
n1 [δυ(b)+( 1− δ)υ(w22)]/υ0(w1)
+n1(1 − δ)(y2 − w22)+[ n − n1(1 − δ)] ˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21),
s.t. b ≤ w22 ≤ y2,
(C)
where the objective function is the weighted sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’
utility in the second period given that senior workers are never replaced by new hires.
The optimal hiring wage ˆ w21 satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
˜ q
0(ˆ w21)(y2 − ˆ w21)=˜ q(ˆ w21). (6)
Since the ﬁrm can commit not to replace senior workers, the hiring wage ˆ w21 aﬀects the
proﬁts of the ﬁrm, but does not aﬀect the utility of senior workers. In particular, an increase
in ˆ w21 has a positive eﬀect on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm because each vacant job is ﬁlled with
higher probability. This eﬀect is measured by the lhs of (6). On the other hand, an increase
in ˆ w21 has a negative eﬀect on the proﬁts of the ﬁr mb e c a u s ei tr e d u c e st h ep r o ﬁt margin on
each new hire. This eﬀect is measured by the rhs of (6). The optimal hiring wage equates
these two eﬀe c t s .T h el h so f( 6 )i sp o s i t i v ef o r ˆ w21 <y 2 and negative otherwise. The rhs of (6)
is zero for ˆ w21 ≤ z and positive otherwise. Hence, the optimal hiring wage lies between the
ﬂow value of search z and the productivity of the ﬁrm y2.M o r e o v e r ,˜ q0(ˆ w21) is a decreasing
function of ˆ w21. Hence, the optimal hiring wage is increasing in y2.
The optimal wage for senior workers ˆ w22 satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
υ
0(ˆ w22)/υ
0(w1) ≥ 1, (7)
and ˆ w22 ≤ y2 with complementary slackness. On the one hand, an increase in ˆ w22 raises the
weighted utility of each senior worker by υ0(ˆ w22)/υ0(w1). On the other hand, an increase in
13ˆ w22 reduces the proﬁtt h a tt h eﬁrm earns on each senior worker by 1 dollar. The optimal
wage for senior workers equates these two eﬀects as long as it satisﬁes the constraint ˆ w22 ≤ y2.
Hence, ˆ w22 is equal to the past wage of senior workers if the ﬁrm’s productivity is greater
than w1,a n di se q u a lt oy2 otherwise. From the properties of ˆ w21 and ˆ w22, it follows that
there exists a ˆ y such that the optimal wage for new hires, ˆ w21, is greater than the optimal
wage for senior workers, ˆ w22,i ft h eﬁrm’s productivity is greater than ˆ y, and such that ˆ w21
is smaller than ˆ w22 if the ﬁrm’s productivity is less than ˆ y. The properties of ˆ w21 and ˆ w22
are summarized in the following proposition and illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
Proposition 3 Let (ˆ w21, ˆ w22) denote the solution to (C). (i) For y2 >z ,t h ew a g ef o rn e w
hires ˆ w21 lies in the interval (z,y2),a n dt h ew a g ef o rs e n i o rw o r k e r s ˆ w22 equals min{w1,y 2}.
(ii) There exists a ˆ y such that ˆ w21 < (>)ˆ w22 if y2 < (>)ˆ y.
3.2.2 Wage policy without replacement
Now, we return to the case in which the ﬁrm cannot commit not to replace senior workers
with new hires. The following proposition characterizes the solution to (K), i.e. the second
period wages that maximize the weighted sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’
utility subject to the no replacement constraint, w22 ≤ w21, and the individual rationality
constraint, b ≤ w22 ≤ y2.
Proposition 4 Let (wk
21,w k
22) denote the solution to (K). (i) For y2 > ˆ y, the wage for new
hires wk
21 equals ˆ w21,a n dt h ew a g ef o rs e n i o rw o r k e r swk
22 equals ˆ w22. (ii) There exists a
yk ∈ (z,ˆ y) such that, for yk <y 2 < ˆ y, wk
21 and wk
22 are both equal to wk
2 ∈ (ˆ w21, ˆ w22). (iii)
For z ≤ y2 ≤ yk, wk
21 and wk
22 are both equal to wk
2 = y2.
The results in proposition 4 are intuitive. When the productivity of the ﬁrm is greater
than ˆ y, the no-replacement constraint does not bind at (ˆ w21, ˆ w22).I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eo p t i m a l
hiring wage wk
21 equals ˆ w21, the wage that the ﬁr mw o u l dc h o o s ei fi tc o u l dc o m m i tn o tt o
replace workers. Similarly, the optimal wage for senior workers wk
22 equals ˆ w22, the wage that
the ﬁrm would choose under commitment. When the productivity of the ﬁrm is between yk
and ˆ y, the no-replacement constraint is violated at (ˆ w21, ˆ w22). In this case, the wage for new
hires and the wage for senior workers are both set equal to wk
2.T h i sﬁrm-wide wage satisﬁes
















2) − ˜ q(w2)
¤
=0 . (8)
The ﬁrst term on the rhs of (8) is the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nwk
2 on the utility of senior
workers and on the proﬁts that the ﬁr me a r n so nt h e m . T h es e c o n dt e r mi st h ee ﬀect of
an increase in wk
2 on the proﬁts that the ﬁrm earns on new recruits. The optimal ﬁrm-wide
wage equates the sum of these two eﬀects to zero. The ﬁrst term on the rhs of (8) is positive
for wk
2 <w 1, and negative otherwise. The second term is negative for wk
2 > ˆ w21.S i n c et h e
constraint wk
2 ≤ y2 does not bind for y2 ∈ [yk, ˆ y], it follows that wk
2 is greater than ˆ w21 and
smaller than ˆ w22 =m i n {w1,y 2}. T h a ti s ,t h eo p t i m a lﬁrm-wide wage is greater than the
wage for new hires and smaller than the wage for senior workers that the ﬁrm would choose
under commitment. Finally, when the productivity of the ﬁrm falls below yk,t h ec o n s t r a i n t
w2 ≤ y2 begins to bind. In this case, the optimal ﬁrm-wide wage equals the productivity of
the ﬁrm. The properties of (wk
21,w k
22) are illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
3.2.3 Wage policy with replacement
The following proposition characterizes the solution to (R), i.e. the second period wages
that maximize the weighted sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the senior workers’ utility subject
to the replacement constraint, w21 <w 22, and the individual rationality constraint.
Proposition 5 Let (wr
21,w r
22) denote the solution to (R). For z ≤ y2 ≤ ˆ y,t h ew a g ef o rn e w
hires wr
21 lies in the interval [z, ˆ w21), and the wage for senior workers wr
22 equals ˆ w22.
The optimal hiring wage wr






21) − ˜ q(w
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On the one hand, an increase in wr
21 aﬀects the proﬁts that the ﬁrm earns on new recruits.
This eﬀect is measured by the lhs of (9). On the other hand, an increase in wr
21 increases
the probability of replacement for senior workers and, hence, it reduces their utility as well
as the proﬁts that the ﬁrm earns from them. This eﬀect is measured by the rhs of (9). The
optimal hiring wage equates these two eﬀects. The term on the lhs is positive for wr
21 < ˆ w21
and negative otherwise. The term on the rhs is positive. Hence, wr
21 is less than ˆ w21.T h a ti s ,
15the optimal hiring wage is lower than the wage that the ﬁrm would oﬀer under commitment.
In contrast, the optimal wage for senior workers wr
22 equals ˆ w22, the wage that the ﬁrm would
choose under commitment. Intuitively, even though the possibility of replacement aﬀects the
utility of senior workers and the proﬁts that the ﬁrm makes oﬀ of them, it does not aﬀect
the optimal resolution of the trade-oﬀ. The properties of (wr
21,w r
22) are illustrated in ﬁgure
3.
3.3 The optimal wage policy
Theorem 6 Let σ∗ =( w∗
1,w ∗
2i) be the optimal wage policy. (i) For y2 ≥ ˆ y,t h ew a g ef o rn e w
hires w∗
21 equals wk
21 and the wage for senior workers w∗
22 equals wk
22,w h e r ewk
2i =ˆ w2i.( i i )
There exists a y ∈ [z,ˆ y) such that, for y ≤ y2 < ˆ y, w∗
21 and w∗
22 are both equal wk
2,w h e r e
wk
2 ∈ (ˆ w21, ˆ w22).
The theorem characterizes the properties of the optimal wage policy of the ﬁrm in the
presence of the replacement problem. First, consider the case in which the productivity of





22)=(ˆ w21, ˆ w22). Under this policy, senior workers have
t h es a m ep r o b a b i l i t yo fe m p l o y m e n ta n dt h es a m ew a g ea su n d e rc o m m i t m e n t . M o r e o v e r ,
under this policy, the ﬁrm recruits the same number of new hires for its vacant jobs and pays
them the same wage as under commitment. Since this policy distorts neither the provision
of insurance to senior workers nor the recruitment of new hires, Vk = ˆ V . In turn, since Vk,
Vr ≤ ˆ V , this implies that the policy without replacement is optimal.
Next consider the case in which the productivity of the ﬁrm is less than ˆ y.I n t h i s
case, the policy without replacement prescribes the wage wk
2 for both new hires and senior
workers, where ˆ w21 <w k
2 < ˆ w22. Under this policy, senior workers have the same probability
of employment but a lower wage than they would under commitment. Moreover, under
this policy, the ﬁrm hires more workers for its vacant jobs and pays them more than in
the commitment case. In contrast, the wage policy with replacement prescribes the wage
wr
21 for new hires and wr
22 for senior workers, where wr
21 < ˆ w21 and wr
22 =ˆ w22.U n d e rt h i s
p o l i c y ,s e n i o rw o r k e r sh a v et h es a m ew a g ea su n d e rc o m m i t m e n t ,b u tal o w e rp r o b a b i l i t yo f
employment. Moreover, the ﬁrm hires fewer workers for its vacant jobs and pays them less
16than it would under commitment. Overall, when the productivity of the ﬁrm is less than ˆ y,
both policies introduce some distortions in the provision of insurance to senior workers and
in the recruitment of new hires, i.e. Vk,V r < ˆ V In principle, either one of these two policies
may be optimal.
However, if the productivity of the ﬁrm is not too far below ˆ y, the optimal wage policy
is always the one without replacement. The intuition for this result is straightforward. For
y2 → ˆ y−, the distortions introduced by the policy without replacement disappear because
wk
2 → ˆ w21, ˆ w22. In contrast, for y2 → ˆ y−, the distortions introduced by the policy with
replacement do not vanish. If wr
21 converges to a value greater than z,t h eﬁrm attracts
some applicants to its ﬁlled jobs and the probability of employment for senior workers is too
low. If wr
21 converges to z,t h eﬁrm does not attract any applicants and the number of ﬁlled
v a c a n c i e si st o ol o w .T h e r e f o r e ,t h e r ee x i s t sa ni n t e r v a l[y,ˆ y] for y2 where the wage policy
without replacement is the optimal one. Whether y is equal to z (and the optimal policy is
a l w a y st h eo n ew i t h o u tr e p l a c e m e n t )o ri ti sg r e a t e rt h a nz (and the optimal policy is the
one with replacement for suﬃciently low y2) depends on the fundamentals of the model. For
the parameter values presented at the end of the next section, we ﬁnd that y = z.F i g u r e4
illustrates an optimal wage policy in which y>z .
The key implication of theorem 6 is that the contractual solution to the worker replace-
ment problem induces a form of downward rigidity in the wage of new hires. The ﬁrm would
like to oﬀer to its senior workers a wage that remains constant over time, and to its new
hires a wage that varies in response to changes in productivity. When the productivity of
the ﬁrm falls below a critical threshold, the wage that the ﬁrm would like to oﬀer to its
new hires is less than the wage oﬀered to senior workers in the past. Since at these wages
the ﬁrm would have an incentive to replace senior workers with new hires, the ﬁrm chooses
instead to oﬀer the same wage to everybody (as long as y2 is not too low). This ﬁrm-wide
wage successfully prevents replacement, but it distorts the wage of senior workers down and
the wage of new hires up. Hence, the optimal solution to the worker replacement problem
dampens the response to negative productivity shocks of the wage oﬀered by old ﬁrms to
new hires.
174 Macroeconomics of worker replacement
This section studies how the worker replacement problem aﬀects the response of unemploy-
ment and vacancies to aggregate productivity shocks. To this aim, the section compares the
predictions of our model with those of a model in which the replacement problem does not
arise because ﬁrms can commit not to substitute senior workers with new recruits.
4.1 Environment
For this section, we restrict attention to a particular stochastic process for the aggregate state
of the economy x and for the idiosyncratic productivity of the ﬁrm y. The aggregate state
of the economy can take one of two values x ∈ {x ,x h},w h e r ex  is a state in which ﬁrms
have low productivity (a recession), and xh is a state in which ﬁrms have high productivity
(an expansion). In particular, when x = xj, j =  ,h,an e wﬁrm has productivity y
j
1 and an
old ﬁrm has productivity y
j
2,w h e r eb<y  
1 <y h
1 and b<y  
2 <y h
2. The aggregate state of the
economy is very persistent, in the sense that πx(xj|xj) → 1 for j =  ,h.T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation
of the stochastic process for x and y aﬀords a clear-cut comparison between the predictions
of our model and those of a model in which ﬁrms can commit not to replace workers.
We also restrict attention to particular parameter values. Let ( ˆ Z,ˆ θ,ˆ σ) be the equilibrium
of a version of the model in which ﬁrms can commit not to replace workers. We choose the





2i(x0)) prescribes a hiring wage that remains constant throughout the life of









21(xj) for j =  ,h. Moreover, we choose the cost of entry k so that number of
applicants attracted by a vacant job remains constant during the life of the ﬁrm. That is,
we choose k so that ˆ θ(W1(ˆ σ(x ),x  )) = ˆ θ(W2(ˆ w 
21(x ),x  )).
The parametric restrictions above can be interpreted as normalizations. If a ﬁrm had
an inﬁnite horizon and a constant productivity, the optimal wage policy under commitment
would prescribe a constant hiring wage and would attract a constant number of applicants
to each vacancy. However, for the sake of tractability, our model assumes that ﬁrms have a
ﬁnite horizon. Hence, if a ﬁrm in our model had a constant productivity, the optimal wage
policy under commitment would prescribe a time-varying hiring wage and would attract a
18time-varying number of applicants. The parametric restrictions above make sure that the
behavior of a ﬁrm in our model reproduces the behavior of a ﬁrm with an inﬁnite horizon.
4.2 Competitive search equilibrium
Lemma 7 Let ( ˆ Z,ˆ θ,ˆ σ) be the competitive search equilibrium of the model in which ﬁrms
can commit not to replace workers. Then (Z,θ,σ) is a competitive search equilibrium of
our model, where: (i) Z = ˆ Z and Z(x ) <Z (xh); (ii) θ = ˆ θ and θ(W,x ) >θ (W, xh);
(iii) σ(x )=ˆ σ(x ) and σ(xh)=( wh
1,w h





i =1 ,2. Moreover, as long as |yh
1 − y 
1| is not too large, wh
2i(x )=w2 for i =1 ,2,w h e r e
ˆ wh
21(x ) <w 2 < ˆ wh
22(x ).
Lemma 7 characterizes the properties of the equilibrium of our model.10 T h ew a g ep o l i c y
of a ﬁrm that enters the labor market during a recession is the same that the ﬁrm would
choose if it could commit not to replace workers. This result is intuitive. The wage policy
under commitment prescribes the wage ˆ w 
1 in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, the
policy prescribes that senior workers should be paid the same wage as in the ﬁrst period,
and that new hires should be paid the wage ˆ w 
21(x0) that maximizes the value of the ﬁrm’s
vacant jobs. Since ˆ w 
1 =ˆ w 
21(x ) and ˆ w 
21(x ) < ˆ w 
21(xh), the optimal wage policy under
commitment never tempts the ﬁrm to replace senior workers with new hires. Hence, it is
also the optimal policy under limited commitment.
T h ew a g ep o l i c yo faﬁrm that enters the labor market during an expansion is σ(xh).I n
the ﬁrst period, the policy prescribes the wage ˆ wh
1. If in the second period the economy is
still in an expansion, the policy prescribes the wages ˆ wh
21(xh) and ˆ wh
22(xh),t h es a m ew a g e s
that the ﬁrm would choose under commitment. These wages are optimal because they do
not induce the ﬁrm to replace senior workers with new hires. If the economy turns into a
recession, the wages ˆ wh
21(x ) and ˆ wh
22(x ) would induce the ﬁrm to replace workers because
ˆ wh
21(x ) < ˆ wh
22(x ). For this reason, the wage policy prescribes the wage w2 for both new
hires and senior workers, where ˆ wh
21(x ) <w 2 < ˆ wh
22(x ).
Notice that, when a ﬁrm enters the labor market, its expected proﬁts are the same as
under commitment. Intuitively, if the ﬁrm enters the labor market during a recession, its
10The proof of Lemma 7 is avaliable upon request.
19expected proﬁts are the same as under commitment because the wage policy is the same. If
the ﬁrm enters the labor market during an expansion, the wage policy is the same as under
commitment as long as the economy remains in an expansion. Since the probability of this
event is 1, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm are the same as under commitment. In turn, from the
free-entry condition, it follows that, if the expected proﬁts of a new ﬁrm are the same as
under commitment, so are the worker’s value of search Z and the expected queue length θ.
Overall, the only diﬀerence between the equilibrium of our model and the equilibrium
of the model with commitment are the wages that old ﬁrms pay to new hires and senior
workers when the economy moves from an expansion to a recession.11 Then, it is clear that
the worker replacement problem will not aﬀect the response of the labor market to a positive
shock to aggregate productivity, but it will have an eﬀect on the response of unemployment,
vacancies and other labor market variables to a negative shock. In the following pages we
shall characterize these eﬀects.
4.3 Unemployment and vacancies
Suppose that the economy moves from an expansion to a recession. In the economy there
are f2 old ﬁrms, where f2 is determined by the history of realizations of the aggregate
productivity shock. Every old ﬁrm has the wage policy σ(xh) which prescribes that both
new hires and senior workers should be paid the wage w2 in the current period. Every old
ﬁrm has n1(1 − δ) ﬁlled jobs and n − n1(1 − δ) vacant jobs. At the search stage, each
one of these vacant jobs attracts θ2 applicants and is ﬁlled with probability q(θ2),w h e r e
θ2 = ˜ θ(w2,x  ). Hence, at the production stage, every old ﬁrm employs n1(1 − δ) senior
workers and [n − n1(1 − δ)]q(θ2) new hires.
Entrepreneurs create f1 new ﬁrms, where f1 is determined endogenously. Every new
ﬁrm chooses the wage policy σ(x ) which prescribes that workers should be paid the wage
ˆ w 
1 in the current period. Every new ﬁrm has n vacant jobs. At the search stage, each
one of these vacant jobs attracts θ1 applicants and is ﬁlled with probability q(θ1),w h e r e
θ1 = ˜ θ(ˆ w 
21(x ),x  ) because of our normalizations. Hence, at the production stage, every
11If the transition probability of x from one state to the other were greater than zero, the worker replace-
ment problem would also have an indirect eﬀect on the value of search Z and on the queue length θ.T h i s
paper does not explore how these indirect eﬀects impact the response of unemployment and vacancies to
productivity shocks.
20new ﬁrm employs nq(θ1) workers.
The number of new ﬁrms clears the market for applicants. That is, the number of new
ﬁrms is such that the number of job applications received by new and old ﬁrms is equal to
the number of workers who apply for a job, a. Since every new ﬁrm receives nθ1 applications
and every old ﬁrm receives [n − n1(1 − δ)]θ2 applications, the number of new ﬁrms is
f1 = {a − f2[n − n1(1 − δ)]θ2}/nθ1. (10)
The vacancy rate, the job-ﬁnding rate and the unemployment rate are












u =1− f1nq(θ1) − f2[n − n1(1 − δ)]q(θ2) − f2n1(1 − δ).
(11)
The vacancy rate v is the sum of vacant jobs at new and old ﬁrms. The job-ﬁnding rate h
is the weighted average of the job-ﬁnding rate for workers who apply for jobs at new and
old ﬁrms. The unemployment rate u is the diﬀerence between the number of workers in the
economy and the number of workers employed at new and old ﬁrms.
4.4 Worker replacement as an ampliﬁcation mechanism
To understand how the worker replacement problem aﬀects the response of the labor market
to a negative productivity shock, we compare the predictions of our model with those of a
model in which ﬁrms can commit not to replace workers. As shown in lemma 7, when the
economy is hit by a negative productivity shock, the wage oﬀered by old ﬁrms to new hires
falls less in our model than it would in a model with commitment. Speciﬁcally, this wage
falls to w2 rather than to ˆ w 
21(x ),w h e r ew2 > ˆ w 
21(x ). Because of this downward wage
rigidity, the number of workers who apply for a vacant job at an old ﬁrm increases more in
our model than it would in a model with commitment. Speciﬁcally, this number increases
to θ2 rather than ˜ θ(ˆ w 
21(x ),x  ), which is equal to θ1 because of our normalizations.
From the above observations and equations (10) and (11), it follows that, when the
economy is hit by a negative productivity shock, the vacancy rate in our model falls more than
it would in a model with commitment. Speciﬁcally, the vacancy rate falls by an additional
∆v = f2 [n − n1(1 − δ)] · [(θ2 − θ1)/θ1] > 0. (12)
21The ﬁrst term on the rhs of (12) is the number of vacant jobs at old ﬁrms. The second
term is the relative diﬀerence between the number of applicants attracted by each of these
jobs in our model and in a model with commitment. This expression is intuitive. For every
additional worker who applies to old ﬁrms, there are 1/nθ1 fewer ﬁrms that ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to enter the labor market and, hence, there are 1/θ1 fewer vacancies.
From equations (10) and (11), it also follows that, in response to a negative productivity
shock, the job-ﬁnding rate in our model falls more than it would in a model with commitment.
Speciﬁcally, the job-ﬁnding rate falls by an additional
∆h =f2[n − n1(1 − δ)][q(θ1)θ2/θ1 − q(θ2)]/a
={f2[n − n1(1 − δ)]θ2/a}·[p(θ1) − p(θ2)] > 0,
(13)
where the second line makes use of q(θ)=p(θ)θ. This expression is intuitive. The ﬁrst term
on the rhs of (13) is the fraction of applicants who look for vacant jobs at old ﬁrms. The
second term is the diﬀerence between the probability that an applicant ﬁnds one of these
jobs in our model and in a model with commitment. Finally, equations (10) and (11) imply
that unemployment in our model increases more than it would under commitment, where
the additional increase is
∆u = f2θ2 [n − n1(1 − δ)][p(θ1) − p(θ2)] > 0. (14)
Overall, the worker replacement problem ampliﬁes the response of the vacancy, job-
ﬁnding and unemployment rates to a negative shock to aggregate productivity. In contrast,
it is straightforward to see that the replacement problem has no eﬀect on how the labor
market responds to a positive shock. Intuitively, the worker replacement problem leads to
a form of downward rigidity in the wage of new hires at old ﬁrms. When the economy is
hit by a negative productivity shock, this downward wage rigidity ampliﬁes the increase in
the number of applicants attracted by old ﬁrms, it ampliﬁes the decline in the number of
ﬁrms that enter the market and, ultimately, the decline in vacancies and the increase in
unemployment. When the economy is hit by a positive productivity shock, the wage of
new hires at old ﬁr m si su n a ﬀected and so are labor market outcomes. These ﬁndings are
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 The worker replacement problem ampliﬁe st h er e s p o n s eo fv, h and u to a
22negative shock to the aggregate productivity x. However, the worker replacement problem
does not aﬀect the response of v, h or u to a positive shock to aggregate productivity.
The model cannot be used for a thorough quantitative analysis of business cycles because
of the assumption that ﬁrms operate for two periods only. Nevertheless, the model can still be
used to get a sense of the importance of the worker replacement problem as an ampliﬁcation
mechanism. To this aim, note that the expected utility of a worker who applies for a job at
an old ﬁrm is the same in our model and in a model with commitment, i.e.
p(θ2)[υ(w2) − υ(b)] + U(x )=Z(x )
= ˆ Z(x )=p(θ1)
£
υ(ˆ w 
21(x )) − υ(b)
¤
+ U(x ).
The above equation implies that p(θ2)[υ(w2) − υ(b)] is equal to p(θ1)
£
υ(ˆ w 
21(x )) − υ(b)
¤
.
Using this fact, we can rewrite ∆u as
∆u = f2 [n − n1(1 − δ)]θ2 · p(θ1) ·
υ(w2) − υ(ˆ w 
21(x ))
υ(w2) − υ(b)
≈ f2 [n − n1(1 − δ)]θ2 · p(θ1) ·





The ﬁrst term on the rhs of (15) is the measure of workers who apply to old ﬁrms. The
second term is the job-ﬁnding probability for a worker who applies to a new ﬁrm. The third
term measures the extent of the wage rigidity caused by the replacement problem as the
ratio between w2− ˆ w 
21(x ) and w2−b. Now, suppose that the measure of workers who apply
to old ﬁrms is 30% per period, that the job-ﬁnding probability is 90%, that w2 − ˆ w 
21(x ) is
0.5% of w2 and w2−b is 30% of w2.12. Given these numbers, the worker replacement problem
ampliﬁes the response of unemployment to a negative productivity shock by approximately
1/2 of a percentage point.13 Considering that in a typical recession the unemployment rate
increases by 3 percentage points and that presumably only a fraction of this increase is
attributable to the decline in labor productivity, the worker replacement problem appears
to be a quantitatively important mechanism through which negative productivity shocks are
12It is easy to construct examples that deliver similar numbers. For instance, suppose that the preferences
of the worker are given by β = .95, b = .46,a n dυ(c)=c1−γ/(1−γ) with γ =2 . Suppose that the technology
of the ﬁrm is given by δ = .1, y 
2 =1and yh
2 =1 .05. Suppose that the matching technology is given by
p(θ)=Mθ
η−1, q(θ)=Mθ
η,w h e r eM =1 /10 and η =1 /2. Then, given our normalizations for y 
1, yh
1 and
k, the measure of workers applying to old ﬁrms is 39%, the job-ﬁnding probability at new ﬁr m si s9 0 % ,t h e
diﬀerence w2 − ˆ w 
21(x ) is .5% of w2,a n dt h ed i ﬀerence w2 − b is 28% of w2.
13By comparison, in the standard search model of Pissarides (1985), a 5 percent decline in productivity
increases unemployment by 0.1 percentage points.
23transmitted into the labor market.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper advances a theory of downward rigidity for the wage on new hires in the context
of a labor market with search frictions. Firms want to insure existing workers against income
ﬂuctuations, because workers are risk averse and have no access to the capital market. To
perform this task eﬃciently, ﬁrms would like to keep the wage of each worker constant over
time. Firms also want to attract applicants to ﬁl lt h ej o b st h a tb e c o m ev a c a n tb e c a u s e
of turnover. To perform this task eﬃciently, ﬁrms would like to oﬀer a hiring wage that
varies over time with the state of the economy. Generally, ﬁrms cannot perform both tasks
eﬃciently because they cannot commit not to replace senior workers with new hires.
The ﬁrst part of the paper studied the eﬀect of the worker replacement problem on
the optimal design of the wage policy of the ﬁrm. We found that, because of the worker
replacement problem, the wage policy prescribes a hiring wage that does not vary as much as
the eﬃcient hiring wage in response to negative productivity shocks. The downward rigidity
in the hiring wage allows the ﬁrm to keep the wage proﬁle of existing workers smooth without
having the temptation to replace them with new recruits. This ﬁnding may help explain why,
in the real world, managers are reluctant to hire new workers for less than the wage of existing
workers even during recessions.
The second part of the paper studies how the worker replacement problem aﬀects the
response of unemployment and vacancies to aggregate productivity shocks. We found that
t h ew o r k e rr e p l a c e m e n td a m p e n st h ed e c l i n ei nt h ew a g eo fn e wh i r e sa to l dﬁrms in response
to a negative shock. In turn, this wage rigidity ampliﬁe st h ei n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro f
unemployed workers who look for jobs at old ﬁrms, it ampliﬁes the decline in the entry of
new ﬁrms in the labor market and, ultimately, it ampliﬁes the increase in the unemployment
rate in response to a negative shock. In contrast, the worker replacement problem does not
aﬀect the response of the labor market to positive aggregate productivity shocks. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation suggests that the worker replacement problem may help explain why
small aggregate productivity shocks are associated with large unemployment ﬂuctuations.
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2627Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Let σ∗ =( w∗
1,w ∗
2i) be the optimal wage policy for a new ﬁrm, given that the aggregate
state of the economy is x, and the productivity of the ﬁrm is y1. Let w∗
21 denote w∗
21(s) for
s ∈ S∗,w h e r eS∗ is the set {(x0,y 0
2,μ 0
2):x0 = x, y0
2 = y2,μ 0
2 ∈ [μ
2,μ2]}. Similarly, let w∗
22
denote w∗




Next, let σ =( w1,w 2i) denote an alternative wage policy such that: (i) for all s/ ∈ S∗, w2i(s)
is equal to w∗
2i(s); (ii) for all s ∈ S∗,w 2i(s) is equal to w2i; (iii) W1(σ,x)=W1(σ∗,x).I n
words, the alternative wage policy σ is such that: (i) in all states s/ ∈ S∗, the wages for new
hires and senior workers are the same as under the policy σ∗; (ii) in all states s ∈ S∗,t h e
wages for new hires and senior workers may be diﬀerent than under the policy σ∗; (iii) in its
ﬁrst period of activity, the ﬁrm oﬀers the same lifetime utility as under the policy σ∗.T h e
last property implies that, in its ﬁrst period of activity, the ﬁrm employs the same number
of workers as under the policy σ∗.
First, consider the case in which w22 ≤ w21 and w22 ∈ [b,y2]. In this case, the diﬀerence
between the proﬁts of the ﬁrm under the wage policy σ∗ and the alternative policy σ
F(σ∗,x,y 1) − F(σ,x,y1)
= n1(w1 − w∗
1)+β Pr(S∗)n1(1 − δ)(w22 − w∗
22)
+ β Pr(S∗)[n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q(w∗
21)(y2 − w∗









22) − υ(w22)]}. (17)




F(σ∗,x,y 1) − F(σ,x,y1)
β Pr(S∗)
¸




+[ n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q(w∗
21)(y2 − w∗
21) − ˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)] ≥ 0.
(18)
Denote as vk(w21,w 22) the objective function in the maximization problem (K). Then, it is




28Next, consider the case in which w21 < w22 and w22 ∈ [b,y2]. In this case, the diﬀerence
between the proﬁts of the ﬁrm under the policy σ∗ and the alternative policy σ is
F(σ∗,x,y 1) − F(σ,x,y1)
= n1(w1 − w∗
1)+β Pr(S∗)n1(1 − δ)[˜ q(w21)w21 +( 1− ˜ q(w21))w22 − w∗
22]
+ β Pr(S∗)[n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q(w∗
21)(y2 − w∗









22) − ˜ q(w21)υ(b) − (1 − ˜ q(w21))υ(w22)]}. (20)




F(σ∗,x,y 1) − F(σ,x,y1)
β Pr(S∗)
¸
= n1(1 − δ)[υ(w∗
22) − ˜ q(w21)υ(b) − (1 − ˜ q(w21))υ(w22)]/υ0(w∗
1)
+ n1(1 − δ)[˜ q(w21)w21 +( 1− ˜ q(w21))w22 − w∗
22]
+[ n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q(w∗
21)(y2 − w∗
21) − ˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)] ≥ 0.
(21)
Denote as vr(w21,w 22) the objective function in the maximization problem (R). Then, it is




Finally, note that inequality (18) holds for all wages (w21,w22) such that w22 ≤ w21 and
b ≤ w22 ≤ y2. Moreover, note that inequality (21) holds for all wages (w21,w22) such that
w21 < w22 and b ≤ w22 ≤ y2. Hence, (18) and (21) imply that vk(w∗
21,w∗






(ii) We omit the proof of part (ii) because it is similar to the proof of part (i). We omit the
proof of part (iii) because it is straightforward. All details are available upon request.
B Proof of Proposition 3
The maximization problem (C) can be written as
ˆ V =[ n − n1(1 − δ)]max
w21
{˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)} + n1υ(b)/υ0(w1)
+n1(1 − δ)m a x
b≤w22≤y2
{[υ(w22) − υ(b)]/υ0(w1)+y2 − w22}.
(22)
(i) Consider the ﬁrst maximization problem in (22). The objective function of this problem
is continuous in w21.I ti se q u a lt oz e r of o rw21 = z, strictly positive for w21 ∈ (z,y2),a n d
29negative for w21 ≥ y2. Hence, the solution to this problem, ˆ w21, exists and belongs to the
interval (z,y2). Now, consider the second maximization problem in (22). It is straightforward
to verify that the solution of this problem, w22,i se q u a lt omin{w1,y 2}.
(ii) Return to the ﬁrst maximization problem in (22). For all w21 ∈ (z,y2),t h ed e r i v a t i v eo f
the objective function with respect to w21 is
d[˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)]
dw21
=˜ q0(w21)(y2 − w21) − ˜ q(w21)
= q0(θ(W2(w21)))θ





υ(w21)−υ(b)(y2 − w21) − q(θ(W2(w21))),
(23)
where the third line makes use of the deﬁnitions of ˜ q(w) and W2(w), and the fourth line
makes use of the equilibrium condition for θ(W).T h eﬁrst term on the rhs of (23) is strictly
decreasing in w21, because q(θ) q(θ)/(1 −  q(θ)) is a strictly decreasing function of θ and
θ(W2(w21)) is strictly increasing in w21. The second term is also strictly decreasing in w21,
because q(θ) is a strictly increasing function of θ. Hence, the objective function is strictly
concave in w21.T h i si m p l i e st h a tˆ w21 i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o
 q(θ(W2(w21)))
1 −  q(θ(W2(w21)))
υ0(w21)
υ(w21) − υ(b)
(y2 − w21) − 1=0 . (24)
The lhs of (24) is strictly increasing in y2 and strictly decreasing in w21. Hence, ˆ w21 is
strictly increasing in y2. For any given w21, the lhs of (24) is strictly positive when y2 is
suﬃciently large. Hence, limy2→∞ ˆ w21 = ∞. From these properties of ˆ w21 and from the fact
that ˆ w21 ∈ (z,y2) and ˆ w22 =m i n {w1,y 2}, it follows that there exists a unique ˆ y such that
ˆ w21 > (<)ˆ w22 if y2 > (<)ˆ y.
C Proof of Proposition 4
The maximization problem (K) can be written as
Vk =m a x
w21,w22
[n − n1(1 − δ)] ˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)+n1υ(b)/υ0(w1)
n1(1 − δ){[υ(w22) − υ(b)]/u0(w1)+y2 − w22},
s.t. b ≤ w22 ≤ w22 ≤ y2.
(25)
First, notice that the objective function in (25) is continuous in (w21,w 22)a n dt h et h ef e a s i b l e
30set is non-empty and compact. Hence, a solution to the maximization problem (25) exists.
Second, notice that the objective function is strictly concave in (w21,w 22) and the feasible
set is convex. Hence, the solution to the maximization problem (25) is unique. Moreover,
the solution (wk
21,w k
22) and the multiplier λ
k satisfy the following necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for optimality with respect to (w21,w 22,λ):
(i) the wage w21 is such that
[n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q
0(w21)(y2 − w21) − ˜ q(w21)] + λ ≥ 0
and w21 ≤ y2, with complementary slackness;
(ii) the wage w22 is such that
n1(1 − δ)[υ
0(w22)/υ
0(w1) − 1] − λ ≤ 0
and b ≤ w22, with complementary slackness;
(iii) the multiplier λ is such that λ ≥ 0 and w21 − w22 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
For all y2 ≥ ˆ y, it is immediate to verify that the triple (ˆ w21, ˆ w22,0) satisﬁes the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for optimality (i)—(iii). For all y2 < ˆ y, it is immediate to verify that
the optimality conditions (i)—(iii) are satisﬁed by the triple (wk
2,w k
2,λ
k),w h e r eλ
k is equal
to n1(1 − δ)[υ0(v2)/υ0(w1) − 1] and wk






+[ n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q
0(w2)(y2 − w2) − ˜ q(w2)] ≥ 0 (26)
and w2 ≤ y2, with complementary slackness.
To characterize the properties of wk







− [n − n1(1 − δ)] ˜ q(y2)=0 .
Clearly, yk is strictly greater than z and strictly smaller than ˆ y. First, consider the case
where y2 ≤ yk. In this case, the lhs of (26) is strictly decreasing in w2, and it is positive
at w2 = y2. Hence, wk
2 equals y2. Second, consider the case where y2 ∈ (yk, ˆ y).I n t h i s
case, the ﬁrst term on the lhs of (26) is strictly decreasing in w2, and it is equal to zero at
w2 = w1. The second term is strictly decreasing in w2,a n di ti se q u a lt oz e r oa tw2 =ˆ w21,
31where ˆ w21 <w 1. Moreover, the sum of the ﬁrst and the second terms is strictly negative at
w2 = y2. Hence, wk
2 is strictly greater than ˆ w21 and strictly smaller than ˆ w22 =m i n {w1,y 2}.
D Proof of Proposition 5
Without the replacement constraint w12 <w 22, the maximization problem (R) can be written
as





n˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)+n1υ(b)/υ0(w1)+
+n1(1 − δ)(1 − ˜ q(w21)) max
b≤w22≤y2





Consider the inner maximization problem in (27). As established in Proposition 3, the
solution to this problem, wr
22, is equal to min{w1,y 2}. Next consider the outer maximization
problem in (27). The objective function is continuous and diﬀerentiable in w21.A l s o ,t h e
derivative of the objective function with respect to w21 is equal to zero for all w21 ≤ z and
is strictly negative for all w21 ≥ ˆ w21. Hence, the solution to this problem, wr
21, exists and
belongs to the interval [z, ˆ w21). Finally, note that wr
21 < wr
22 because ˆ w21 < min{w1,y 2} for
all y2 < ˆ y. Hence, the solution to the maximization problem (27) is also the solution to (R).
E Proof of Theorem 6
The maximization problem (C) can be written as
ˆ V (y2)= m a x
w21,w22
[n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)] + n1υ(b)/υ0(w1)
+n1(1 − δ){[υ(w22) − υ(b)]/υ0(w1)+y2 − w22}
s.t. b ≤ w21,w 22 ≤ y2,
(28)
where we made the dependence of ˆ V on y2 explicit. The objective function in (28) is contin-
uous in w21,w 22 and y2. The feasible set in (28) is non-empty, bounded and continuous in
y2. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value function ˆ V (y2) is continuous in y2.
The maximization problem (K) can be written as
Vk(y2)= m a x
w21,w22
[n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)] + n1υ(b)/υ0(w1)
+n1(1 − δ){[υ(w22) − υ(b)]/υ0(w1)+y2 − w22}
s.t. b ≤ w21,w 22 ≤ y2,
(29)
The objective function in (29) is continuous in w21,w 22 and y2. The feasible set in (29) is
32non-empty, bounded and continuous in y2. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the
value function Vk(y2) is continuous in y2.N o w ,n o t i c et h a tt h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o ni n( 2 9 )i s
the same as in (28) and the feasible set in (29) is a subset of the feasible set in (28). Hence,
Vk(y2) ≤ ˆ V (y2). Moreover, note that (wk
21,w k
22) equals (ˆ w21, ˆ w22) for all y2 ≥ ˆ y. Hence,
Vk(y2)=ˆ V (y2) for all y2 ≥ ˆ y.
The value function Vr(y2) is smaller than V r(y2),w h e r e
V r(y2)=m a x w21 n˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)+n1υ(b)/υ0(w1)+
+n1(1 − δ)(1 − ˜ q(w21)){[υ(ˆ w22) − υ(b)]/υ0(w1)+y2 − ˆ w22}
s.t. z ≤ w21 ≤ y2.
(30)
The objective function in (30) is continuous in w21 and y2. The feasible set in (30) is non-
empty, bounded and continuous in y2. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value
function V r(y2) is continuous in y2.
The diﬀerence between ˆ V (y2) and V r(y2) is
ˆ V (y2) − V r(y2)
= min
z≤w21≤y2
n1(1 − δ)˜ q(w21){[υ(ˆ w22) − υ(b)]/υ0(w1)+w21 − ˆ w22}
+[n − n1(1 − δ)][˜ q(ˆ w21)(y2 − ˆ w21) − ˜ q(w21)(y2 − w21)].
(31)
From the concavity of υ,i tf o l l o w st h a tυ(ˆ w22)−υ(b) is strictly greater than υ0(ˆ w22)(ˆ w22−b).
From the inequalities ˆ w22 ≤ w1 and b ≤ z ≤ w21, it follows that υ0(ˆ w22)(ˆ w22 − b) is strictly
greater than υ0(w1)(ˆ w22 − w21). Hence, the ﬁrst term on the rhs of (31) is strictly positive
for all w21 >z , and it is equal to zero for w21 = z. Moreover, the second term on the rhs of
(31) is strictly positive for all w21 6=ˆ w21, and it equals zero for w21 =ˆ w21. Since ˆ w21 >z ,i t
follows that the rhs of (31) is strictly positive. Hence, ˆ V (y2) > V r(y2).
I nt h ea b o v ep a r a g r a p h s ,w eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e dt h a tVk(y2)=ˆ V (y2) and V r(y2) < ˆ V (y2) for all
y2 ≥ ˆ y. Since the value functions Vk(y2), ˆ V (y2) and V r(y2) are continuous with respect to y2,
there exists an y ∈ [z,ˆ y) such that Vk(y2) > V r(y2) for all y2 ∈ (y, ˆ y).S i n c eV r(y2) ≥ Vr(y2),
the previous observations imply that the optimal wage policy prescribes the wages (wk
21,w k
22)
for all y2 > y.
33